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is an old man with a low level of schooling, member of a large party which
does not support the government and who is elected in jurisdiction with a low
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‘Only remain ‘back bencher’ the one who is not motivated nor talented enough1.’
-Guy Carcassonne, constitutional scholar (1989)
1 Introduction
In January 2016, after weeks of debates, the French National Assembly proceeded to
the preliminary vote of the first article of a project of constitutional revision, giving
to the state extended emergency powers during a security crisis. On 577 deputies,
103 voted for, 26 against and 7 abstained. 441 deputies did not show up for the vote.
Such an absenteeism rate for a highly controversial project set off a wave of protest
against the lack of involvement of MPs into the legislative process.
Notorious cases of frivolous elected officials shirking their duties are not restricted
to a particular country: Andrew Thompson has been suspended from Canadian
Senate for chronic absenteeism in 1997. German former Minister of Finance Peer
Steinbrück was at the center of a scandal after having missed several important par-
liamentary sessions in order to give paid speeches elsewhere2. Neither it is restricted
to a particular period: in order to fight endemic absenteeism and the ‘generally low’
level of morale of Roman senators, Augustus introduced a system of quorum and
fines in 9 BC (Talbert, 1984). For the same reason, the Tudor’s House of Lords
imposed a daily attendance register back in 1515 (Graves, 2014, p.35).
This paper provides a simple exploratory work depicting a portrait of the ghost
deputies of the French National Assembly from 1959 to 2012. By ghost deputies,
I mean deputies who do not have any registered activity over a whole year in the
records of the Parliament. The traditional role of a deputy is threefold: to exert
control on the government, to produce legislation and to represent the electorate
(Duhamel, 2009). A deputy cannot reasonably achieve these tasks without leaving a
trace in the official record. Having a zero output is hence unambiguously an indicator
of shirking.
From a political agency perspective, the electoral mechanism plays a dual role to
1’Ne reste ‘back bencher’ que celui qui n’est pas assez motivé ou pas assez doué pour cesser de
l’être.’
2This example is mentioned in Bernecker (2014).
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prevent elected politicians to shirk. First, politicians are supposed to be accountable
for their behavior in office. In order to get reelected, politicians have to provide
a minimum level of effort. The situation is a typical moral hazard problem, and
election can be seen as a disciplining device providing incentives to politicians not
to shirk (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986). Second, since all politicians are not all of
the same quality, institutions should be designed in order to favor the selection of
the ‘good’ type, and voters typically face an adverse selection problem (Besley, 2005,
2006; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). This selection mechanism generated an extensive
empirical research relating individual politicians’ characteristics to their behaviour
and performance in office (for instance Besley et al., 2011; Dreher et al., 2009; Hayo
and Neumeier, 2014; Jochimsen and Thomasius, 2014; Moessinger, 2014).
The purpose of the paper is threefold. First, it aims at providing evidence on the
relationship between politicians’ individual characteristics and their negative perfor-
mance. A large amount of papers develop a measure of performance attempting to
capture incumbent’s influence on economic outcomes, such as GDP growth or pub-
lic deficits. These aggregates are not under his/her direct control and hence very
noisy. Focusing on MPs allows for a clear, direct observation of individual politi-
cians’ behaviour. Galasso and Nannicini (2011) and Gagliarducci et al. (2010) use
absenteeism rate as a measure of performance in the Italian Parliament. The major
problem with these measures is that a politician might look good simply by sleeping
on the bench of Parliament. Arnold et al. (2014), Gavoille and Verschelde (2017)
and Hurka et al. (2017) propose measures of performance based on MPs’ parliamen-
tary activity, i.e., on what deputies actually do within the Parliament. But contrary
to these papers, the simple measure binary measure I use allows to isolate a set of
MPs that fail to fulfil their duty3. For this reason, it is relevant to check whether
the(sometimes tenuous) correlations between personal characteristics and politician’s
performance observed in previous studies still hold using such a clearcut measure.
Observing what are the characteristics associated with bad politicians is of specific
importance since many papers use observable characteristics as ex ante measures of
3This set is certainly only a subset of shirking deputies, but focusing on zero registered activities
eludes the question of the importance and the quality of an individual activity item. It may be
discussable whether the performance of deputy with 20 entries in the register is necessarily better
than the performance of a deputy with 10 entries, as it would imply to assess and compare the
relevance and quality of each item. Comparing the performance of any of these two MPs with a
third MP having zero registered activity is however straightforward.
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the quality of politicians, but rarely verify the relevance of these proxies with respect
to performance4. The politicians’ level of education is in particular commonly used
for this purpose (Baltrunaite et al., 2014; De Paola and Scoppa, 2011; Kotakorpi and
Poutvaara, 2011). If Besley et al. (2011) find a relation between national leaders’
education and GDP growth, this relation remains to be verified in a more direct, sim-
ple setting. Other proxies for quality include the previous occupation (Baltrunaite
et al., 2014; De Paola and Scoppa, 2011), the political local experience (Braendle,
2015; Galasso and Nannicini, 2011) and being born in the district of election (Shugart
et al., 2005). This latter paper is in particular based on the assumption that MPs
born in their district of election are more involved in parliamentary work. Studying
the characteristics of the French ghost deputies over 50 years will allow to provide
support - or not - to these common critical assumptions.
Second, I investigate whether the correlations between individual characteristics
and the probability to be a ghost deputy are stable over the years. As illustrated
above, problems related to shirking behaviours are far from being a recent phe-
nomenon, but the characteristics of the ghost deputies may be different depending
on the period. For instance, Gavoille and Verschelde (2017) observe a time-varying
relationship between electoral competition and the activity of the French deputies.
For this reason, I exploit the relatively large time span of the dataset to check whether
the variables characterizing ghost deputies 50 years ago are the same variables as for
the current ones. If the characteristics of the ghost deputies are not stable over time,
it would raise the question of the relevance of the use of such variables to proxy
the ex ante quality of politicians, as they might not be good indicators of future
performance.
Third, this paper provides a simple test of whether voters punish ghost deputies
in the ballot, using a Vote-Popularity function (Nannestad and Paldam, 1994; Pal-
dam, 2008). For elections to be an effective disciplining device, deputies with a low
implication in legislative activities should be associated with a lower probability to
achieve reelection. The French parliamentary elections are a two-round majoritarian
system5. Some papers highlighted the fact that determinants of the electoral out-
4Alternatively, Besley et al. (2017) proposed a measure of politician’s quality based on the
residuals of a fully saturated Mincer equation.
5With the exception of the 1986 elections, which used a proportional system.
4
come may be round-specific (for instance Cassette et al., 2013). I thus check whether
voters consider the personal record of their incumbent deputy in the same way at
the first and at the second round.
To conduct the analysis, I use a comprehensive dataset containing precise in-
formation on the deputies of the Fifth French Republic, from the first year of the
first legislature in 19596 to the last year of the XIII th legislature in 2012, for a
total of more than 24,000 observations. This dataset encompasses various political
variables, but also many personal characteristics, such as occupation and years of
schooling. The French National Assembly is an ideal testing ground. First, the insti-
tutional context remains (quasi) stable since 1958, allowing meaningful comparisons
over such a long period. Second, this institutional stability is paired with a highly
heterogeneous political context: left-wing majorities followed by right-wing ones, the
so-called cohabitation periods, during which the President and the Prime Minister
were of opposite political sides, coalition governments, single-party majorities, etc.
The results of the analysis provide some insightful contributions to the literature
on the quality of politicians. First, the results indicate that the typical ghost deputy
is an old man with a low level of schooling, member of a large party which does
not support the government and who is elected in jurisdiction with a low level of
political competition. These results provide some insights into the actual debates
about reforms of the National Assembly, such as gender quotas, limitation of multiple
office-holding and a decrease in the number of deputies. Second, those results are
however mitigated by the fact that the relationship between these factors and the
probability of being a ghost deputy is not stable over time. In particular, personal
characteristics are less and less related to this probability over the years. Concerning
the electoral performance, ghost deputies overall face more difficulties to achieve
reelection. However, voters do consider the incumbent’s record at the first round, as
well as some other personal characteristics, but at the second round, only national
politics matters. This confirms the saying ‘choosing at the first round, eliminating
at the second’.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an
overview of the related literature. Section 3 presents the institutional context. The
6The actual Constitution has been introduced in October 1958, so the first effective year of
parliamentary work is 1959.
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dataset is described in Section 4, while Section 5 presents the empirical analysis.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
The idea that individuals, and not only institutions, matter has been formally intro-
duced in political economy with Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990), who
proposed the first theoretical models allowing politicians to differ in competence,
aiming at explaining pre-electoral policy manipulations. In contrast to the Down-
sian paradigm, policy choices are not only influenced by the median voter but also
by the identity of the decision-maker. This explicit acknowledgment that politicians
have idiosyncratic characteristics is at the core of a second generation of politi-
cal agency models, which combine both adverse selection and moral hazard issues
(Besley, 2006). Contrary to earlier works (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986), these mod-
els conceive elections not only as a disciplining mechanism, but also as a selection
device (Banks and Sundaram, 1993; Besley and Case, 1995; Besley, 2006; Persson
and Tabellini, 2000 among many others): if politicians differ in quality, institutions
should be designed to favour the selection of incumbents of the good type.
The role of institutions in political selection is often investigated within a citizen-
candidate framework (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997). This
model removes the categorization of agents between politicians and citizens by con-
sidering that politicians are selected among the set of citizens who decide to run for
elections. As quality is not equally distributed among citizens, the determinants of
the pool of candidates, such as the wage of politicians (Besley, 2004; Caselli and
Morelli , 2004; Kotakorpi and Poutvaara, 2011; Messner and Polborn, 2004 for in-
stance) and reservation quotas (Chattopadhyay and Duflo , 2004), are of primary
interest. Instead of focusing on the offer of politicians, some papers focus on the
demand-side (Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008; Galasso and Nannicini, 2011, 2015). Since
parties play a gate keeping role in many context, they investigate the recruitment
strategy of political parties and the factors that can incentivize them to recruit good
candidates.
These theoretical considerations generated a very rich empirical literature about
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individual politicians7. Jones and Olken (2005) study the impact of national leaders
on GDP growth. Using the sudden death of the leaders, they are able to establish
a causal link between the individual leader and the GPD growth of the country. If
leaders matter, what are the characteristics of the ‘good’ leaders? Extending Jones
and Olken (2005), Besley et al. (2011) observe that leaders’ level of education matters
for national growth, highly educated leaders being associated with a higher economic
growth. Similarly, Congleton and Zhang (2013) finds that US presidents with a
higher human capital have better economic performance. Hayo and Neumeier (2016)
uncover a relationship between leaders’ socio-economic status and the debt-to-GDP
ratio in OECD countries.
But as stated by Jones and Olken (2005, p. 836), ‘looking at [economic] growth
sets the bar for individual leaders quite high’. The transmission chain from the
quality of the leader to growth (or to any other indicator of economic performance)
is long, complex and noisy. To overcome this issue, two strategies can be adopted.
First, several papers reduce the length of the transmission mechanism by studying
lower tiers of government (see Jochimsen and Thomasius, 2014, Hayo and Neumeier,
2012, Hayo and Neumeier, 2014, and Moessinger, 2014). This strategy mitigates the
problem but does not solve it. A second possibility is to focus on cases where the
action of individual politician is directly observable. In this respect, the legislature is
an ideal playground. Several papers focus on the MPs’ vote attendance and absen-
teeism rate, which can be considered as valence issues : all voters presumably agree
that the lower absenteeism the better, and can thus be used as performance mea-
sures. Gagliarducci et al. (2010) and Becker et al (2009), for instance, investigate the
link between outside earning of respectively Italian and German MPs and their pres-
ence in the parliament. Closer to this paper, Galasso and Nannicini (2011) observe
that Italian MPs elected in contested districts have a lower absenteeism rate, even
after controlling for reelection incentives. They also uncover a negative correlation
between educational attainment and absenteeism.
The problem with performance measures based on presence/absence is that such
measures do not necessarily reflect the input of politicians into the work of the
Parliament. It remains possible that a deputy would have the same contribution to
7See Braendle (2016) for a review of the literature on the institutional determinants of political
selection.
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the debates if he/she was away. To avoid this problem, Arnold et al. (2014) and
Gavoille and Verschelde (2017) propose measures of performance based on activity :
what matters is thus what MPs actually do. Still, even with such measures, it remains
complicated, if not impossible, to assess the quality of each single piece of an MP’s
work. It is thus complicated to define a set of MPs performing well. At the opposite,
this paper adopts the most simple alternative: by focusing on the deputies who do
not have any single recorded work over a whole year, it is possible to isolate a set of
deputies that are undoubtedly ‘bad’, as will be argued in Section 4.
3 Institutional context
The French Parliament is bicameral, consisting of the Sénat and the Assemblée Na-
tionale. The deputies of the National Assembly are elected through direct elections,
while senators are indirectly elected, motivating the focus on the former. The natural
duration of deputy’s mandate is five years. The president of the Republic however
has the power the dissolve the National Assembly. Since 1958, this happened five
times. Deputies are elected with a two-round majoritarian system. There is no term
limit. Each constituency elects one deputy. If no candidate receives more than 50%
of the votes at the first round, only candidates obtaining more than 12.5% of the
votes in the first round are qualified for the second round. In a majority of cases
only two candidates run for the second round. The only exception to these electoral
rules is the 1986 elections, which adopted a proportional system, before moving back
to the previous electoral system at the next election8. Since then, the total number
of deputies is fixed to 577.
Concerning the legislative process, a bill is originated either by the government
or by a MP. Once put on the agenda, the bill is discussed and amended within the
relevant committee. There are eight permanent committees in the National Assembly
(such as defense, foreign affair, finance, etc.)9. At this stage, a rapporteur is selected
to follow the development of the bill. After debates, the amended project is then
8The change of electoral system was a move from president François Mitterrand aiming at
softening the upcoming defeat of his Socialist Party (Chevallier et al., 2012).
9There were six permanent committees before 2008 and a revision of the Constitution.
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discussed in plenary sessions, where each article is first individually voted10. For
important laws, another vote occurs at the end of this process on the overall text.
Once voted by a first chamber, the bill goes the the second one, where it is a gain
discussed in committee, amended and then discussed again in a plenary session. The
bill is promulgated if the second chamber votes and validates the very same text as
the one voted in the first chamber. In case of modification, the bill goes back to the
previous chamber, where it is discussed again. The process is virtually endless until
the two chambers agree. In case of persistent disagreement, a Commission Mixte
Paritaire (a joint committee) can be created, composed of seven deputies and seven
senators, with the aim of finding an agreement. If after this step there is still no
consensus, the final decision goes to the National Assembly.
The party system can be described as ‘bipolar multipartism’ (Knapp and Wright,
2001): in line with the Duverger law, the two-round majoritarian electoral system is
a force tending to bipolarisation, but each pole remains multiparty. The governing
majority is based on a clear left-wing or right-wing coalition, and does not rely on a
pivot party likely to change partner during a legislature, ensuring stability. This is
evidenced by the fact that even if the government is responsible before the deputies,
the National Assembly dismissed a government only once, in 1962. The length of
the presidential mandate being of seven years (until the 2002 constitutional reform,
shifting it to five years) whereas the mandate of a deputy is for five years11.
4 Data
To conduct the analysis, I constructed a dataset containing detailed information
about all the deputies of the French V th Republic from its beginning in 1958 to the
last year of the XIII th legislature, 2012. I only keep deputies who stayed in office
the whole legislature (more than 2,400), for a total of over 24,000 observations. The
dataset encompasses the main variable of interest, Ghost, and two sets of variables:
10This is at this stage that most of deputies did not come for the vote in the first example in the
introduction.
11The victory of the right in 1986 legislative elections lead to the first cohabitation, a period
during which the President and the Prime Minister are of two opposite wings, resulting in a ‘two-
headed executive’ (Lewis-Beck, 1997). Two other cohabitation periods took place between 1993
and 1995, and between 1997 and 2002.
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a set of deputies’ personal characteristics variables and a set of political variables.
Summary statistics are displayed in Table 1.
[Table 1 around here]
The main variable of interest, Ghost, is a dummy variable that takes the value one
for observations that do not have any recorded activity for a full year. This variable
is built from the Tables Nominatives, an official document produced by the National
Assembly itself summing up the achievement of each of its member year after year
in plenary sessions. This National Assembly document records four activity items:
debates in which the deputy has been involved in plenary sessions, law proposals,
reports, and question to the government. A ghost deputy is thus a deputy who did
not produce any report, did not participate to any debate, did not propose any bill
nor ask any question to the government during plenary sessions.
In the political science literature, questions to the government are seen as a way to
represent the electorate by transmitting concerns from the local jurisdiction (François
and Weill, 2014) but also as a tool for controlling the action of the government by
asking for clarification on government’s intention. To play a role in the legislative
process, a deputy can propose a bill. If between 80% and 90% of the laws are initiated
by the government, proposing a bill is a part of the legislative process: bills initiated
by the government are often based on previous bills proposed by deputies (Avril,
2005). Another way to participate in the legislative process is to be selected as a
reporter for a bill. The reporter of a bill has a major role in its development, as
he or she is for instance in charge of writing the text incorporating the committee
suggestions. This text is then discussed in the plenary session, the reporter has
to defend the amendments adopted during the committee work. The reporter thus
exerts a great influence in the final output. As an important share of the bills is
originated by the government, and considering the amendment power of the reporter,
it is also a way to control government activity. Finally, a deputy can also take part in
the debates during plenary sessions, for instance in order to defend an amendment.
Considering the mission of a deputy and the four activity items that are regis-
tered in Tables Nominatives, a deputy who does not leave a trace over a whole year
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in the record cannot be considered as fulfilling his or her duty. Having a zero out-
put is hence unambiguously an indicator of bad performance. Contrary to papers
focusing on vote attendance or absenteeism (for instance Bernecker, 2014; Galasso
and Nannicini, 2011; Gagliarducci et al., 2010), it focuses on what deputies actually
do (or do not), on what is effort and competence demanding. The time structure
of the dataset and the evolution of ghost deputies over time is provided in Table
2. This table describes the number of observations by legislature, and among them
the number of observations having a 0 output. The share of ghost deputies per
legislature shows a negative trend. During the first legislature, almost 25% of obser-
vations did not have a recorded activity. The share of ghosts almost continuously
decreases, with the noticeable exception of the IIIrd legislature. This legislature
took place during a period of massive social protest, which caused interruptions of
the parliamentary work. The share of ghosts decreased to about 6% for the XIII th
legislature. A potential critic is that the work in committee is not taken into account
by the measure of activity. Some deputies could be specialized in committee work,
while some others are specialized in plenary session work. Note however that the two
types of session are mechanically linked. For instance, writing a report involves an
important committee work, as the reporter follows the bill all along the legislative
process. Moreover, statistics about attendance to committee meeting is available for
the XIII th legislature (2007-2012), thanks to the watchdog website nosdeputes.fr12.
For this legislature, the correlation between Ghost and committee attendance is equal
to -0.235.
Several factors can contribute to understand this decrease. First, the large share
of ghost deputies in the early legislatures can be justified by the time required to
adapt to new institutions, new rules and new procedures. Many deputies already
served under the IV th Republic, a fully parliamentarian system granting them differ-
ent powers and missions than under the V th Republic. Second, a professionalisation
of the deputies occurred over the period, as documented by ?. This results in more
politically experienced deputies, potentially more likely to follow and participate into
the debates. Third, in addition to the ordinary parliamentary sessions, the Prime
Minister can call extraordinary sessions if required by the political agenda. These
sessions were rare at the beginning of the period, but became more and more used
12www.nosdeputes.fr.
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over time. Fourth, the media coverage of the parliamentary work increased over time.
Since 1983, the Wednesday afternoon session is live broadcasted on a national chan-
nel, since 2000 the National Assembly benefits of its own channel to broadcast the
debates and a watchdog website scrutinizes MPs’ activity since 2009. Finally, two
reforms attempted to limit multiple office-holding, a prevalent situation in the con-
text of the French parliament, in 1985 and 2000. Even if these restrictions are rather
loose, they might have contributed to push deputies to focus on their mandate13.
[Table 2 around here]
The first set of variables contains personal characteristics that are typical from
the literature on the quality of politicians (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011). It en-
compasses several demographics. Age may be related to the effort devoted to the
mandate. For instance, considering career prospects, older deputies have less incen-
tives to exert effort. Woman takes the value one for women. Several papers observed
that women are more active in the legislative arena (for instance Hurka et al., 2017
and van Geffen, 2016). The National Assembly is often criticized for its low share of
female deputies: as seen in Table 1, less than 10% of observations are women. MPs’
occupation are represented through nine categories encompassing more than 65% of
the deputies. The occupation can provide deputies with some specific skills. For
instance, Dreher et al. (2009) find that politicians with a entrepreneur background
are more successful at implementing market-oriented reforms. Here, less than 8%
of the deputies have a business background, whereas the most represented category
is teachers, with about 15% of the observations. This category is composed of civil
servants, which are particular MPs in term of skills, public sector knowledge and
motivation (Braendle and Stutzer, 2013). Finally, Schooling (measured as the dif-
ference between the number of years required to obtain the highest level diploma
of a deputy and 6, the legal age for mandatory school) is a measure of social cap-
ital. Besley et al. (2011) established a causal link between the level of education
13First, in 1985, MP were forbidden to simultaneously hold two additional mandates in this list:
MEP, member of the regional council, member of the district council, mayor of a municipality of
more than 20,000 inhabitants and deputy-mayor of a municipality of more than 50,000 inhabitants.
Second, the 2000 reform extended the previous list to any position in a municipal council of a
municipality of more than 3,500 inhabitants. It means that all over the period, a deputy can run
a municipality (whatever its size) in parallel of his/her parliamentary mandate. Starting in 2017,
deputies can no longer be simultaneously mayors and deputies.
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of national leaders and GDP growth. On the other hand, Galasso and Nannicini
(2011) show that for Italian MPs, years of schooling and absenteeism rate is pos-
itively correlated. The data also includes a dummy indicating deputies who were
born in the jurisdiction they represent. Shugart et al. (2005) use this variable as
a measure of the implication of politicians’ local commitment. If this is the case,
it should be negatively correlated with the probability of being a ghost. Another
dummy takes the value of 1 for deputies who graduated from ENA, the prestigious
administration school14. Their knowledge of the cogs of the institutions might affect
as well their participation in the Assembly’s activity. All the data was essentially
obtained through the National Assembly website15, personal websites, biographies,
Who’s who in France dictionaries, and Wikipedia.
The second set of variables contains political variables. Right, Centre and Left
are dummies indicating the political ideology of the deputy (based on his/her polit-
ical group). Exp is a count of the number of years as deputy. A higher experience
may be related to a greater understanding of the functioning of the Parliament and
a greater authority. It can nevertheless also be associated with some fatigue and
erosion of the interest in Parliamentary activity, leading to a lower participation.
Groupsize is the number of members of the political group to which the observa-
tion belongs. Several papers (for instance Rogers, 2002) investigate free-riding in
legislature, and posit that the greater the size of the political group, the lower the
incentives to make efforts. In the same vein, Maj takes the value 1 for deputies sup-
porting the government. Being in the opposition may reduce the incentive to exert
effort, as documented in François and Weill (2014). Mayor is a dummy indicating
deputies that are simultaneously mayor. This is a prevalent situation (51% of the
deputies in the dataset have a municipal mandate in parallel), which is at the center
of public debates for decades and suspected to be a major cause of low parliamen-
tary implication (see Bach, 2011; François and Weill, 2014). Finally, Galasso and
Nannicini (2011) suggest that the ex ante level of political competition impacts the
quality of politicians that parties recruit, which is evidenced in the case of the French
deputies by Gavoille and Verschelde (2017). Competition is a measure based on the
Herfindahl index of the vote shares at the first round at the previous election. It is
14Many French politicians and administrators are graduates from this school, including for in-
stance Jacques Chirac and François Hollande.
15www.assemblee-nationale.fr.
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computed as follows: Competition = 1 −
∑
i s
2
i , with s the share of vote of party
i at the first round. Using a measure based on a Herfindahl index, as in Larcinese
(2014), De Paola and Scoppa (2011) and Gavoille and Verschelde (2017) for instance,
presents several advantages compared to a measure based on the vote margin. First,
because of the two-round electoral system, the decisive round is not everywhere the
same. Winning with a 10% margin at the first round or winning with a 10% margin
at the second round does not reflect the same level of political competition. Second,
due to the so-called ‘bipolar multipartism’, a candidate winning with a large margin
at the second does not mean that the candidate easily accessed to the second round.
For instance, if several candidates of the left compete at the first round, but only
one access to the second round, this candidate is likely to benefit from vote trans-
fers. Focusing on the second round vote margin would overlook such mechanisms.
Third, more practically, using a measure of competition based on the first round al-
lows a greater number of observations, since a second round does not occur in every
jurisdiction.
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 The characteristics of the ghost deputies
This subsection aims at determining the variables associated with the probability for
a deputy to be a ghost, using a simple general set up that can be written as follows:
Ghost = f(personal characteristics, political variables).
Table 3 presents the result of four different specifications. In all the models,
Ghost is the (binary) dependent variable, taking the value of 1 for deputies with
an empty record over the year. All the regressions include controls for committee,
legislature and regional dummies. Model 1 is a linear probability model (LPM),
model 2 is a Logit model. Considering the usual caveats of the LPM model, the
reference model is the Logit, the LPM being presented for robustness purpose. For
both models, the Huber-White standard errors are displayed16.The marginal effects
16Results are qualitatively similar with ”standard” standard errors and with clusters at the indi-
vidual or at the district level.
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for the Logit model (evaluated at means) are summed up in Figure 117.
[Table 3 around here]
[Figure 2 around here]
If Age and its square are significant in the LPM specification, only the squared
term is in the Logit specification. To visualize how Age and the probability of being
a ghost are related, the marginal effect of Age is displayed in the panel a of Figure 2,
holding all other regressors at their mean value. One additional year increases more
and more the probability of having a zero production, as shown in Figure 2. Holding
the other variables at the means, a 40 years old deputy is almost three times less
likely to be a ghost than a 70 years old deputy (7.5% compared to 20%). Women
are also less likely to be a ghost deputy by about 4 percentage points, as can be seen
in Figure 1: keeping all the covariates are their means, the probability for a female
deputy to be a ghost is about 8%, while it is 12% for a male deputy. This is consistent
with Hurka et al. (2017) and van Geffen (2016), who find that women have a higher
activity in the European Parliament. Even though the theoretical rationale for this
finding is unclear, many behavioural economics papers evidence that women have
a higher working ethics (Dollar et al., 2001). For the 2017 election, the financial
penalties for parties that do not respect the 50% quota for female candidates at
the legislative elections has been drastically increased. This may help to reduce the
number of ghost deputies, if it turns into a higher share of female in the National
Assembly.
A deputy elected in his/her native neighbourhood is not less likely to be a ghost.
This does not support the assumption made by Shugart et al. (2005), who posit
that being a local implies a higher involvement in legislative activities. Holding
all the variables at their mean, a deputy with the lowest level of education has a
probability to be a ghost of about 12%, whereas a deputy with the highest level of
education has a probability of only 6%. This is consistent with previous literature,
17The models use the lagged level competition. For this reason, the first legislature is excluded
and does not appear on the graph. Similarly, this variable is not available for the eighth legislature,
as it follows a a reform of the voting rules (see Section 3). Excluding this variable and using the
full sample provides qualitatively similar results.
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since Galasso and Nannicini (2011) find that schooling is associated with a lower
absenteeism rate, and Besley et al. (2011) show that more educated leaders obtain
better economic performance. The énarques turn out to be less likely ghosts. This
has to be related to Padovano and Gavoille (2017), who observe that the higher the
number of ENA graduates in the government, the lower the legislative production.
This suggests that énarques may use their technical competence in favor of a higher
qualitative legislative output, rather than a quantitative achievement. Concerning
occupations, only three specific categories emerge. Deputies working in education
and as industry workers (blue collars) are less likely to be a ghost. For the former,
this is consistent with Braendle and Stutzer (2013), who find that a higher share
of public servants in the German Laender parliaments is associated with a higher
number of interpellations. Concerning, the workers, they are often assumed to be
low skilled politicians (see for instance De Paola and Scoppa, 2011), but it might be
balanced by a higher motivation. Only one type of occupation is associated with a
higher probability of being a ghost deputy: occupations related to healthcare. This
result has to be put in perspective to the moonlighting politicians literature (for
instance Gagliarducci et al., 2010 in the case of Italian MPs, and Becker et al, 2009
in the case of German federal assembly), which relates outside earnings to political
effort, since, say, cardiologists are likely to keep their professional activity, at least
partially.
Concerning the political variables, right and left-wing politicians are less likely to
have a zero production than centrist politicians (the reference group). Experience is
positively related to the probability of being a ghost deputy, even though the marginal
effect is very weak: deputies with a 20 years experience are only 1 percentage point
more likely to be a ghost than newcomers. A potential reform of the National
Assembly often mentioned in the debate consists in imposing a term limit in order to
renew a larger share of deputies at each election. This reform could help to reduce
the share of ghost deputy. However, in accordance with the free-riding in legislature
theory (Rogers, 2002), the larger the political group, the higher the probability of
shirking. Deputies of the opposition are also more likely to be a ghost. At the
same time, mayors are more prone to have a zero production. Those two results
are in line with Bach (2011), who find that deputies holding a local executive office
reduces committee attendance by one third, a decrease of the same magnitude as
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that of belonging to the opposition. Since the 2017 legislative election, deputies
cannot simultaneously hold a mayoral office. This should contribute to reduce the
number of ghost deputies. Finally, deputies elected in an ex ante unsafe districts are
also less likely to shirk. Holding other variables at their means, a deputy elected in
a district with the minimum value of competition is two times more likely to be a
ghost than a deputy elected in a district with the maximum value of competition, with
respectively 13 and 6% probability. This is in line with Galasso and Nannicini (2011)
and Gavoille and Verschelde (2017)18. As the decrease of the number of deputies
was in the program of Emmanuel Macron, a potential redistricting should promote
political competition in order to further minimize the share of ghost deputies.
[Figure 1 around here]
[Figure 2 around here]
In the previous models, all observations were pooled, implying that unobserved
heterogeneity of the deputies was not accounted for. To check the sensitivity of the
results to the introduction of individual effects, I estimate two additional models:
a random effects logit and a conditional fixed-effect logit. In the former, the in-
dividual deputy component is modelled as a random variable following a Normal
distribution with 0 mean and variance σ2c . The problem with this model is that
the consistency of the estimates depends on the assumption that the regressors are
independent of the unobservables (Wooldridge, 2010). This assumption does not
seem realistic in the Parliament context: think for instance of rhetoric skills and
occupation. With the conditional fixed-effect model, individual effects are allowed
to be correlated with regressors. However, the estimation of this model implies a
severe sample selection, as it requires the endogenous variable to vary within the
same individual. All deputies who always had a production greater than 0 every
year as well as deputies who never produced anything during their career are thus
excluded. All the remaining deputies have been at one point considered as ghosts,
and hence have different characteristics19. Also, as in the linear framework, I cannot
18I also check whether there is a specific relationship between the region of election and the
probability of being a ghost deputes. No specific pattern emerges: deputies from distant regions do
not exhibit a higher probability of being ghost, neither is there a dichotomy between rural/urban
regions.
19In particular, they have on average a lower level of education and are elected in ‘easier’ districts.
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obtain estimates for time-constant regressors. Some variables, like groupsize and
Comp are legislature-specific. For those variables, the estimates are computed using
exclusively deputies who have been elected in more than one legislature. Finally, it
is not possible to obtain marginal effects as the individual effects are not computed
(see Wooldridge, 2010).
Column 3 of Table 3 reports the results obtained using a random effects logit. The
estimates are remarkably close to those of the standard logit. Most of the coefficients
have a similar sign to what was obtained in previous models, and in particular all
the variables found previously found significant. The negative influence of Woman
and Schooling on the probability to be a ghost deputy remain highly significant
whereas Mayor and Groupsize keep their significant positive coefficient. The results
concerning the conditional fixed-effect logit are displayed in column 4. Age appears
in this specification negatively related to the probability of being a ghost, contrary
to the previous models. However, the squared term has a rather low p-value (0.13),
knowing that the sample size is now much smaller. Experience remains positively
and significantly correlated with Ghost, and the other regressors keep their sign,
except Maj which is now positive (but not significant).
5.2 The ghost deputies and their characteristics over time
The purpose of this subsection is to evaluate the evolution over time of several
variables affecting the probability of being a ghost deputy. The large time span of the
dataset, running over more than 50 years, allow such an investigation. To do so, I run
the same model as the Logit above, including an interaction term between legislature
and the variable of interest. To my knowledge, this the first time that such an analysis
is performed, with the exception of Gavoille and Verschelde (2017) who focus on the
time-varying relations between political competition and the productivity of deputies.
Results are provided in Figure 3 and Figure 4. All the marginal effects are computed
keeping other variables at their mean values.
[Figure 3 around here]
[Figure 4 around here]
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Overall, the results indicate that the intensity of the relationship between observ-
able personal characteristics and the probability to be a ghost deputy is decreasing
over time. In other words, it becomes harder and harder to predict who will be a
ghost deputy based on these characteristics.
First, if getting older, as observed in the previous subsection, has always a positive
impact on the probability of being a ghost deputy, this effect tend to decrease over
time. While one additional year was associated with almost one percentage point
higher probability of begin a ghost deputy in the 60’s (legislature 2 and 3), the impact
is much lower in recent legislatures, although the mean and standard deviation of this
variable remains roughly stable over time. A second interesting finding is related to
Schooling, since it is a measure that is often used as a proxy for quality: an increase
in education does not necessarily implies a decrease of the probability to shirk. If
education can arguably be a relevant proxy for competence, it however does not
always correlate with performance. The marginal impact of schooling was also much
higher during the first legislatures. Also, the gender difference tends to vanish as
well over time. The same pattern occurs for Experience, Majority and Mayor. It
seems that these characteristics were much more important in the beginning of the
period under consideration. In other words, while having a parallel local mandate
was detrimental to legislative activity up the V II th legislature, since the X th it does
not seem to play a role anymore. This decrease of significance of Mayor cannot be
exclusively attributed to the limitation of multiple office-holding. During the IX th
legislature (1988-1993, so after the implementation of the 1985 reform limiting office-
holding), the effect of mayor is still significant. Mayor becomes insignificant only at
the X th legislature (1993-1997), before the the implementation of a second reform
in 2000. There is thus no strong evidence that these reforms directly impacted the
prevalence of ghost deputies, at least in the short run. Concerning Competition, here
also the relationship is not stable over time. During the first and the last legislature,
an increase of the ex ante level of competition does not come with a decrease of the
probability to shirk. This corroborates the results of Gavoille and Verschelde (2017),
who find an inverse-U relationship over time between competition and productivity.
Finally, the impact of Groupsize is much more erratic, but is always positive.
How to explain the weakening of the relationship between the personal charac-
teristics and the probability to be a ghost deputy? Tentatively, this weakening could
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translate a change in the political personnel over time. In particular, Boelaert et al.
(2017) document a growing professionalization of the deputies over these last 40
years. In 1978, deputies on average spent 46% of their active life in politics, 67.7%
in 2012. Considering the road to the National Assembly, deputies obtained their
first mandate on average 6 years after entering politics in 1978. In 2012, this ac-
tive partisanship period doubled. Finally, the percentage of deputies who previously
had a position of parliamentary assistant increased from 14% to 33% between 1978
and 2012. This professionalisation may have resulted in an homogenisation of the
deputies’ practice, attenuating the importance of their background.
5.3 The ghost deputies and their reelection perspectives
The last part of this analysis investigates the reelection perspectives of the ghost
deputies. The aim is to check whether voters punish deputies shirking in the parlia-
ment, hence, whether the electoral mechanism provides incentives to the deputies.
To explore this issue, I simply estimate a Vote-Popularity function (Nannestad and
Paldam, 1994) taking the general form of:
V ote=f(Ghost, controls).
Table 5 presents the results of four different models. They differ by their de-
pendent variable. The endogenous variable of the first model is a binary variable
indicating whether the deputy ran for reelection of not. In the second model, the
dependent variable is another binary taking the value of 1 if the deputy achieved
reelection. Finally, model 3 and 4 respectively use the vote share of the incumbent
respectively at the first and the second round of the election. For all these models,
the Huber-White standard errors are displayed.
[Table 5 around here]
The main independent variable of interest is Ghost (remind that it takes the
value of 1 for a deputy who did not produce anything during a full year a the
legislature). The controls include all the personal characteristics used in the previous
subsections as well as the political variables. In addition, it introduces a measure of
the unemployment level at the level of the département to take into account the local
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economic context. An important data restriction has to be noted. Before the 1988
elections, the electoral results provided by the Ministry of Interior did not mention
the name of the candidates but only the political parties. It implies that it is not
possible to track individual politicians before this election. In other words, I cannot
know if an incumbent quitting office did not run or has been defeated. This is why
this subsection focuses on 5 elections: 1993, 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012. Summary
statistics are provided in Table 4.
Before discussing the VP-functions estimations, it is interesting to observe the
factors associated with the probability to abstain from running again for office, esti-
mated using a logit model. First, ghost deputies are less likely to seek for reelection.
This suggests that a lower level of motivation affects legislative activity. It is however
not excludable that parties act as gatekeepers and do not endorse ghost deputies. As
one can expect, Age and Experience are also correlated with the decision not to run.
Deputies holding a parallel municipal office are less likely to retire. Finally, a higher
level of unemployment is associated with a higher probability to run for reelection.
Concerning model 2 (which is also a logit model) and the probability of reelection,
the ghost deputies seem to face more difficulties to achieve reelection. Even if this
result cannot be interpreted in a causal way (as there might be in particular reverse
causation), the magnitude of the marginal effect is quite important: keeping all the
variables at their mean, a deputy who did not have any activity in the parliament for
at least a year sees his/her reelection probability decreasing by 6 percentage points.
Experience helps to achieve reelection. At the opposite, leftist deputies and deputies
of the majority are less likely to be reelected. The second result is consistent with
the fact that except in 2007, the governing political wing never managed to keep its
majority at the next election. Finally, the stiffer the competition at the previous
election, the lesser the reelection probability.
Going in the details of the vote shares at the two rounds, an interesting pattern
appears. At the first round, Ghost, Age and its square, Schooling and Mayor
turn significant, and with the sign that one might expect. The effect of Age follows
an inverse-U relationship, and mayors obtain better scores. This is consistent with
Cassette et al. (2013), who find that mayors running for reelection are more easily
reelected if they simultaneously hold a mandate in the parliament. But at the second
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round, none of these (personal) variables is significant, and only political variables
seem to matter: Left and Center, Maj and Exp. This suggests that except for
experience, all that matters in the second round is political, national consideration.
This is perfectly in line with Cassette et al. (2013), who observe the same pattern in
the case of the municipal elections. With respect to Ghost, it indicates that ghost
deputies achieve lower performance at the first round, but if they manage to access
to the second round, this will not penalize them. This supports the saying ‘choosing
at the first round, eliminating at the second’.
Finally, Figure 5 displays the marginal effect of Ghost obtained with model 2,
conditional on the election year. First, the marginal effect is significantly different
from 0 for all elections. Between 1993 and 2007, however, it appears that voters
were less and less prone to punish ghost deputies: in 1993 a ghost deputy was on
average about 9% less likely to obtain reelection, but the magnitude of this effect
continuously decreased to reach only 3% at the 2007 elections. The 2012 election
marked a break in this tendency, as ghost deputies were this time 6% less likely to
succeed in getting reelected.
[Figure 5 around here]
6 Conclusion
The role of a deputy of the French National Assembly presupposes at least a mini-
mum of activity to be achieved. Exploiting the activity register of the Parliament,
I isolate a specific type of politicians, the ghost deputies, i.e., deputies who did not
leave any trace in the record of the Parliamentary works. This new, simple mea-
sure of politicians’ performance has the merit of being unambiguous, contrary to
previous measures used in the literature. Depicting the portrait of such a group
of politicians allows to investigate the relationships between personal characteristics
and performance previously observed in the literature in a more simple setting.
The results indicate that the typical ghost deputy is old man with a low level of
schooling, member of a large party which does not support the government and who
is elected in a jurisdiction with a low level of political competition. However, the
relationship between these factors and the probability of being a ghost deputy is not
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stable over time. For most of the personal variables, the link with this probability
was much more pronounced during the first legislatures than in the recent period, it
eroded over time. This suggests that the link between variables like schooling and
experience, often used as proxies for quality in the literature, do not necessarily cor-
relate with performance. More research is necessary to understand in which contexts
personal characteristics are likely to be good predictors of decision maker’s behaviour
and in which context they are not.
Finally, the last step of the analysis consisted in investigating whether the ghost
deputies are sanctioned by voters. Overall, got deputies face more difficulties to
achieve reelection. However, studying separately the vote margin at the first and
at the second round, a clear pattern appears: the personal characteristics of the
incumbent candidate are correlated with voters’ choices, and having been shirking
in the parliament is associated with a decrease in the vote share. But at the second
round, only national politics seems to matter, and personal characteristics, including
the performance in the National Assembly, do not matter anymore. Future research
should however find a context that will allow providing evidence of a causal link
between shirking and electoral performance.
If we consider that institutions should be designed to avoid ghost deputies, these
results have several public policy implications. Even though the predictive power of
observables characteristics tend to decrease over time, the results provide insights
on recent and potential future reforms of the French National Assembly. First,
deputies elected at the 2017 legislative elections are forbidden to simultaneously
hold a mayoral office. As multiple-office was found to be positively related to the
probability of being a ghost deputy, this should contribute to reduce the number
of ghost deputies. Second, since 2000, the legislation imposes a gender quota for
the candidates, each party being required to nominate 50% of women. In practice,
parties often fail to meet this requirement, and face financial penalties (only 41.6%
of candidates were women in 2007, 40%in 2007). Assuming that it would results in
more female deputies, the increase of this financial penalty implemented for the 2017
legislative election can be seen as a tool favouring the reduction of ghost deputies,
as women are less likely to fall in this category. Third, seven candidates (out of
eleven) running for the 2017 presidential election proposed to decrease the number
of deputies. Emmanuel Macron proposed to reduce the number of deputies from
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577 to roughly 300, in order to gain in ”efficiency”. This reform would imply a
massive redistricting. If preventing ghost deputies is seen as a gain in efficiency, this
redistricting should be conceived in a way that it enhances political competition, as
deputies elected in district with stiff competition are less likely to shrink on average
over the period. This downshift would also imply a limitation of the size of political
groups, which would help to reduce free riding. Fourth, a potential reform often
mentioned in the debates consists in limiting deputies’ career to three consecutive
terms. There is (little) evidence that the number of years spent in the parliament
increases the probability of being a ghost deputy. In addition, this limitation in
time could indirectly reduce the average age of deputies, hence reducing the number
of ghost deputies. Finally, even though ghost deputies are associated with a lower
probability to achieve reelection, there is no trace of such penalty at the second
round. Independent watchdog initiatives such as nosdeputes.fr, providing since 2009
daily data about MPs’ activity, can both reinforce voters’ information and provide
additional incentives for deputies not to shirk. In the vein of studies focusing on
televised legislatures (Crain and Goff, 2012 for instance), the effect of introducing
such voters’ information devices on MPs’ behaviour is a promising path for future
research.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
ghost 0.13 0.337 0 1 24016
Age 53.922 9.702 26 93 24016
Woman 0.059 0.236 0 1 24016
Shooling 15.356 3.472 5 21 24016
Localbirth 0.471 0.499 0 1 22942
ENA 0.044 0.206 0 1 24016
Teaching 0.151 0.358 0 1 24016
Healthcare 0.12 0.325 0 1 24016
Legal 0.091 0.288 0 1 24016
Business 0.077 0.266 0 1 24016
Academics 0.056 0.23 0 1 24016
Farmer 0.053 0.223 0 1 24016
Politics 0.046 0.21 0 1 24016
Engineer 0.041 0.199 0 1 24016
Bluecollar 0.035 0.183 0 1 24016
Right 0.549 0.498 0 1 24016
Centre 0.075 0.264 0 1 24016
Left 0.376 0.485 0 2 24016
Maj 0.611 0.488 0 1 24015
Groupsize 178.53 103.26 0 363 24016
Exp 7.8 6.137 1 45 24016
Mayor 0.511 0.5 0 1 24016
Competition 0.725 0.077 0.206 0.960 20873
Table 1: Summary statistics
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Legislature Beginning End Observations Ghosts Share of ghosts
1 1958 1962 1736 441 0.254
2 1963 1966 1700 295 0.173
3 1967 1968 876 304 0.347
4 1969 1972 1564 207 0.132
5 1973 1977 1855 219 0.118
6 1978 1980 1323 107 0.080
7 1981 1985 2035 274 0.134
8 1986 1987 1074 147 0.136
9 1988 1992 2400 383 0.159
10 1993 1996 1908 145 0.075
11 1997 2001 2540 245 0.096
12 2002 2006 2610 216 0.082
13 2007 2011 2395 145 0.060
Table 2: Time span and observations
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Table 3: Ghost deputies regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LPM Logit RE logit Conditional Logit
Age -0.00405∗∗ 0.00114 -0.00432 -0.149∗∗∗
(0.00200) (0.0198) (0.0348) (0.0486)
Age2 0.0000695∗∗∗ 0.000303∗ 0.000515∗ 0.000559
(0.0000188) (0.000173) (0.000309) (0.000373)
Woman -0.0330∗∗∗ -0.535∗∗∗ -0.771∗∗∗ -
(0.00742) (0.131) (0.281)
Localbirth -0.00305 -0.00926 0.118 -
(0.00481) (0.0501) (0.120)
Schooling -0.00477∗∗∗ -0.0447∗∗∗ -0.0734∗∗∗ -
(0.000921) (0.00915) (0.0231)
Ena -0.0211∗∗∗ -0.425∗∗∗ -0.681∗ -
(0.00809) (0.154) (0.366)
Academics 0.0142 0.189 0.206 -
(0.0106) (0.115) (0.298)
Bluecollar -0.0964∗∗∗ -0.958∗∗∗ -1.385∗∗∗ -
(0.0119) (0.154) (0.380)
Business 0.00265 0.0203 0.0413 -
(0.00920) (0.0921) (0.241)
Engineer -0.000584 -0.0438 -0.302 -
(0.0119) (0.120) (0.336)
Farmer -0.0102 -0.0987 -0.0581 -
(0.0125) (0.104) (0.283)
Healthcare 0.0203∗∗ 0.206∗∗ 0.439∗ -
(0.00907) (0.0948) (0.245)
Legal 0.00885 0.134 -0.0579 -
(0.00899) (0.0986) (0.244)
Politics -0.00911 -0.120 0.0423 -
(0.00953) (0.131) (0.302)
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Table 3: (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LPM Logit RE logit Conditional logit
Teaching -0.0338∗∗∗ -0.361∗∗∗ -0.326∗ -
(0.00705) (0.0760) (0.194)
Right -0.0205∗∗ -0.280∗∗∗ 0.272 -
(0.0103) (0.107) (0.199)
Left -0.00867 -0.200∗ 0.299 -
(0.0102) (0.110) (0.220)
Exp 0.000559 0.00913∗ 0.0286∗∗ 0.0749∗∗
(0.000465) (0.00467) (0.00977) (0.0262)
Groupsize 0.000307∗∗∗ 0.00369∗∗∗ 0.00342∗∗∗ 0.00123
(0.0000296) (0.000406) (0.000715) (0.000892)
Maj -0.0101∗ -0.162∗∗ -0.107 0.105
(0.00573) (0.0704) (0.120) (0.149)
Mayor 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗ 0.0721
(0.00445) (0.0474) (0.0871) (0.113)
Competition -0.0942∗∗∗ -1.064∗∗∗ -1.097∗ -0.577
(0.0337) (0.354) (0.612) (0.706)
Legislature dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes -
Committee dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 20872 20872 20872 9086
R2 0.0898
AIC 13534.1 11279.0 5716.3
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Ghost 0.238 0.426 0 1 3001
Age 55.954 9.463 30 90 2987
Sex 0.084 0.278 0 1 3001
Localbirth 0.471 0.499 0 1 2468
Schooling 15.765 3.232 5 21 2987
Ena 0.06 0.238 0 1 2987
Right 0.581 0.493 0 1 2996
Center 0.033 0.18 0 1 2996
Left 0.419 0.493 0 1 3001
Maj 0.618 0.486 0 1 2987
Exp 10.47 6.734 2 45 2987
Maj 0.618 0.486 0 1 2987
Mayor 0.503 0.5 0 1 2987
Comp 0.734 0.073 0.401 0.961 2450
Unemp elect year 8.822 2.174 4.350 15.65 3001
Table 4: VP-function summary statistics
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Table 5: VP function regression results
(1) (2) (3) (5)
Not stand Reelection Voteshare Round 1 Voteshare Round 2
Ghost 0.344∗∗ -0.334∗∗ -0.0159∗∗∗ -0.000152
(0.141) (0.134) (0.00493) (0.00545)
Age -0.101 0.0682 0.00985∗∗∗ 0.00163
(0.0792) (0.0672) (0.00268) (0.00313)
Age2 0.00163∗∗ -0.000891 -0.000102∗∗∗ -0.00000890
(0.000658) (0.000609) (0.0000244) (0.0000287)
Sex 0.0227 0.254 0.0149∗ 0.0121
(0.233) (0.214) (0.00846) (0.00862)
Localbirth -0.131 0.225∗ -0.00394 0.00241
(0.133) (0.123) (0.00582) (0.00593)
Schooling -0.0477∗ 0.0208 0.00242∗∗ 0.000582
(0.0266) (0.0239) (0.00106) (0.00110)
Ena 0.175 0.126 -0.00106 0.00661
(0.282) (0.268) (0.0113) (0.0137)
Left 0.290∗ -0.340∗∗ -0.0559∗∗∗ -0.0456∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.163) (0.00580) (0.00594)
Neutral 0.176 1.061∗∗ 0.0237 0.0774∗∗∗
(0.337) (0.460) (0.0148) (0.0192)
Exp 0.0464∗∗∗ 0.0545∗∗∗ -0.000612 -0.00152∗∗∗
(0.0100) (0.0126) (0.000511) (0.000534)
Maj -0.0219 -2.253∗∗∗ -0.0522∗∗∗ -0.0713∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.164) (0.00416) (0.00490)
Mayor -0.566∗∗∗ 0.0963 0.00926∗∗ -0.00173
(0.131) (0.117) (0.00466) (0.00493)
Comp 1.969 -5.710∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗
(1.240) (1.213) (0.0471) (0.0589)
Unemp elect year -0.124∗∗∗ -0.0443 -0.000939 -0.00316
(0.0466) (0.0392) (0.00292) (0.00349)
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Table 5: (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Not stand Reelection Voteshare Round 1 Voteshare Round 2
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Election dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2449 2049 2049 1717
r2 0.670 0.948
aic 1853.2 2046.8 -5596.3 -4920.0
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 1: Overall marginal effects
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(d) Competition
Figure 2: Marginal effects
Note: The marginal effects are plotted at the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th percentile ranks.
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(d) Exp
Figure 3: Evolution over time (1)
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(a) Mayor
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(d) Groupsize
Figure 4: Evolution over time (2)
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Figure 5: Conditional Marginal effects
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